Aristotelian Definition of Phronesis: Clear and Convincing

Aristotle. Courtesy: www.britannica.com

AC MacIntyre, in his After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory (1981), has interpreted the concept of "phronesis" developed by Aristotle. Defining Aristotelian concept of phronesis in his own words, MacIntyre says that phronesis is "a moral and intellectual virtue rooted in a natural human capacity to do the right thing in the right place at the right time in the right way" (qtd. in Carr 39). MacIntyre's interpretation of the concept of phronesis has differentiated it from "techne" on the basis of its moral and intellectual aspect. Techne and phronesis are two major branches of practical philosophy of education. Since MacIntyre's definition has clearly hinted the aspect which differentiates the two – presence or absence of moral value, it is well defined and holds the true meaning of phronesis. Thus, it is agreeable.

Aristotle defined techne and phronesis in order to show that learning and reasoning are not just technical ("techne"), rather they also involve moral and intellectual values ("phronesis"). Of course, many things that humans learn, reason and practice in life are mere technical, like speaking words, looking toward what comes before eyes and walking around with no purpose. But, such tasks are relatively few in comparison to "phronesis" which involves some purposes backed up by its moral, intellectual and practical implications. Most of the lessons one learns in life are not just technical, but somehow morally and intellectually informed and they aim to serve practical aspirations of the learner. They aim to lead the learner to achieve something better. That is what MacIntyre calls, "the right thing in the right place at the right time in the right way" (Carr 39). For example, education, music, sports, literature are such domains of phronesis which aim to that end.

Another assertion that Aristotle makes is that phronesis is "rooted in a natural human capacity".  Here, Aristotle is not claiming that moral and intellectual values are natural and innate in themselves, but what he claims is they are "rooted" in a natural human capacity. It means that phronesis is acquired (thus it is not natural), but what enables human being to acquire such values is natural and innate. Aristotle views that human beings already have some disposition that enables them to wish and pursue "the right thing in the right place at the right time in the right way". Therefore moral and intellectual values have been existed in teaching-learning practices for ages. Had they been completely natural and innate, there would not have been any need to teach them or learn them.

It is practice that facilitates acquisition of phronesis. Phronesis "is a capacity that can only be acquired by an individual … in the course of being initiated into a particular practice" (Carr 39). Carr also explains that practice is inseparable to its end or vice versa for phronesis. When one practices it, she already has the end in her mind. And, as said, the end is morally and intellectually informed value. Means and ends in phronesis are in reciprocal relationship. Thus it is different from techne which is learned in isolation and later applied in practice.

It is interesting to juxtapose the Aristotlean concept of phronesis with the Socratic concept of learning / recollection. In his dialogue with Meno as recorded by Plato, Socrates has discussed if virtue can be taught and/or how it is acquired. Since the phronesis is also a moral and intellectual virtue, Socrates' dialogue with Meno on virtue and its acquisition rightly fits into this discussion about phronesis.

For Aristotle, practice is both source and method of acquisition of phronesis. But for Socrates, practice holds less importance for acquisition of virtue as it cannot be taught. Virtue doesn't come from practice, neither is it natural in human beings, according to Socrates. He tells Meno, "Virtue comes to be present by divine apportionment in those to whom it comes" (Plato 28). Given that it is divine, human beings have no control over source of virtue. Also, about methods, Socrates believes that no any method would enable humans to learn anything, but only to recollect. "There is nothing it (the soul) has not learnt…learning and inquiry are then wholly recollection" (Plato 11). However, Socrates believes that one need to practice industry and inquiry to recollect, to get virtue. Thus, if industry and inquiry are considered practices, the methods of acquisition of virtue / phronesis are practice, despite the fact that the source is transcendental and divine.   

But, from the perspective of educational practice, the Socratic perception seems problematic. For Socrates, nothing can be taught and learned, but only recollected from the immortal soul. If this was the case, there would not be any need to discuss anything about the philosophy of education. Socrates has supported his argument with the facts that many virtuous men couldn't teach virtue to their children. But, it is wrong to claim that no any "praxis" – phronesis-applied morally informed human practices – can be taught or learnt. Virtue is only one among many scopes of phronesis, thus there are many branches of phronesis or praxis that in deed can be taught and learned. As MacIntyre, and by implication Aristotle, have claimed they can be acquired through practice and practical experiences.  

MacIntyre's definition of Aristotelian phronesis clearly states what phronesis is, why it is needed and how it is acquired. Reading closely, the definition has included all the aspects of the concept as well as provided hints to differentiate it from techne. Also it has provided a fertile ground for comparison of the concept with similar concepts like that of Socratic recollection. The definition, thus, is convincing and gives the reader enough bases for agreement.

Works Cited

Carr, Wilfred. "What is the philosophy of Education?" The Routledge Falmer Reader in the Philosophy of Educatio. Oxon: Routledge. 2005. 34-49.

Plato. "Meno."  Philosophy of Education: The Essential Texts. Ed. Steven M. Cahn. New York: Routledge. 2009. 1-29.