Globalisation beyond West and America

Courtesy: The Economist

Globalisation, etymologically, can be understood as the process by which something hitherto belonging to a particular place, community or culture expands itself to the world. Also, it is a result of such process. Though the word, thus, carries a neutral meaning and concept primarily without discriminating between places and cultures from different parts of the world, many people view that the process of globalisation is unilateral and its movement is from the West to the East. Hence, for them, globalisation is equal to westernisation. Likewise, many of them believe that America – the United States of America – is the centre of the West and consequently westernisation most of the times means Americanisation.

Yes, America is significant in the West and the West is transmitting its cultures and values across the world in the name of globalisation. Yet, it may be a narrow, thus incomplete, view that America only is the world leader; for other nations too are also proving their powers in different times. European nations including Britain and France assert their dominance in world politics frequently. Also, nations from the "non-west" like China, Japan and Russia also come to the front in different issues backed by their increasing economic strengths.  Globalisation today thus does not mean westernisation; and westernisation is also not limited to Americanisation. Globalisation today is also outside America and the West.  

With the rise of globalisation, nation states, once considered centres of political and economic powers, are gradually becoming less or non-significant. Ohmae argues that "Less visibly, but arguably far more important, the modern nation state itself – that artifact of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries – has begun to crumble" (209). He says, with increasing use of information and technologies for living, political boundaries of nation states are less significant and contemporary economy is borderless. But, there are people and organisations who/which are trying hard to assert significance, potential and role of particular nation states in the globalised world politics. They attribute more roles to some particular nation states in controlling the world politics. Their assertions help establish the equation that globalisation means Americanisation.

Attempts to establish the argument that globalisation is Americanisation can be seen in America in some organised and institutional forms. In 1997, the Project for the New American Century was established as a think tank to promote a global American leadership. The Project suggested that America historically has been a leading world power and it should maintain that status for ever. For maintaining that leadership status, the nation should adopt appropriate defence and foreign policies, according to the organisation. Referring to a former President of the US, Ronald Reagan, the organisation clearly mentioned in its statement of principles that America needs "a military that is strong and ready to meet both present and future challenges; a foreign policy that boldly and purposefully promotes American principles abroad; and national leadership that accepts the United States' global responsibilities" (246).  

The Project that had been very influential during the administration of former President George W Bush argued clearly that America, as a global leader, has a natural responsibility to lead the world. That responsibility, as they defined, also means influencing other nations, cultures and peoples to follow the America and the Americans – perhaps, in the name of globalisation. The Project also wrote in its statement of principles, "…we cannot safely avoid the responsibilities of global leadership or the costs that are associated with its exercise. America has a vital role in maintaining peace and security in Europe, Asia and the Middle East" (246). Apparently, an underlying assumption here is that the West is more civilised and developed than the East, and that makes the latter to follow the former. In the West also, they perceived America as the leader and took it for granted that globalisation is westernisation, which in turn is Americanisation.    

But, the world politics could not be as America-controlled as the Project for the New American Century thought. That may be the reason why the Project dissolved in 2006, just nine years after its foundation. While the Project was arguing for the American global leadership, the European Union (EU), as a centre of the world power, was strengthening itself in Europe in terms of political, economic and cultural influences across the world. The EU itself is a challenge to the American belief that America is the leader of the West and the globe because "the EU is the most original and successful experiment in political institution-building since the Second World War" (Giddens and Beck 337). This challenge from the Europe significantly asserts that the West is also Europe and Europe is not America; suggesting globalisation is not Americanisation, even if it is westernisation.

Though Europeans are divided in their perception of the purpose why Europe should become the world leader, most of them agree that the continent has to strengthen itself and make it capable enough to prove itself a leader of the world, the world which also includes America. Garton Ash explains that Europe today is more a nation than a continent and Europeans are citizens of a single European nation. Bringing ideas from European philosophers including Immanuel Kant and Jurrgen Habermas, Garton Ash lists out three claims about modern Europe that "Europe is different from the United States, that in these differences Europe is, on the whole, better than the United States, and that a European identity can and should be built upon these differences – or superiorities" (334).

Garton Ash describes that in Europe today, two major groups exist in terms of what role the region should play in the world politics – Euro-Gaulists and Euro-Atlanticts (333). These two groups have significant differences on why Europe should rise as a world power. Whereas Euro-Gaulists want Europe to become stronger for itself, not to challenge the United States (ignoring the United States); the Euro-Atlanticists argue that Europe should rise to become the leader, but at the same time stay close to the United States. Despite these differences and confusions, Europeans want Europe assert its European identity to influence the world politics. For Europeans, thus, globalisation or westernisation can never be equal to Americanisation.

More daring challenge against the equation -- that globalisation is equal to westernisation is equal to Americanisation – is not from Europe, but from the so-called non-West, from Asian nations. China has been seen as the most significant one. While it is rising as an inevitable part of the global economy, the Asian giant cannot be denied today in world politics because of the share of economy it has in the global market. Practices of economic and political reforms in China are not led or guided by the West, neither America, nor Europe. It began from within China with ideas of native Chinese state leaders. Thus, China is an unavoidable evidence to prove that globalisation is not only about westernisation or Americanisation, for a nation from the East has globalised itself so profoundly that "China's sizable role as a political force on the world stage is all but guaranteed" (Guthrie 331).

Guthrie mentions, "It is no longer controversial to state that China will play a pivotal role in the political and economic structure of the world in the twenty-first century" (332). Though he admits that the question of what that role will be still remains an unanswered question, he is very clear in his assertion that the changes in China – which are led by state authorities and their leaders - are global in terms of their influence (332). Guthrie's observation is that state involvement in the reform process makes changes in China more effective and sustainable – "…state-led development may be far superior to letting the market work its magic" (332). This sustainable, effective and radical nature of Chinese changes also strongly undermines the assumption that equated globalisation, westernisation and Americanisation. His concluding prediction further intensifies the antithesis against the equation: "As the twenty-first century unfolds, China's role in the global economy will continue to grow and transform" (332).

Nations, societies and cultures are being globalised. While the world is shrinking, paradoxically old unified centres are being challenged and multiple centres are being created. Yesterday, America was the global leader. The leadership position of America may be retained till today, but it is also true that there are other such leaders in the world. The European Union (as a single nation) and China are two apparent examples of such power centres. Whereas the EU disproves the equation that westernisation is Americanisation; non-Western nations like China reject that globalisation is westernisation. Existence of such multiple global leaders and multiple power centres, thus, has rejected the assumption that globalisation, westernisation and Americanisation are one and the same.

Works Cited

Garton Ash, Timothy. "Europe as Not-America." Globalization: a Reader. Ed. Charles Lemert, Anthony Elliott, Daniel Chaffee and Eric Hsu. New York: Routledge. 2010. 333-336.

Giddens, Anthony and Ulrich Beck. "The Future of Europe." Globalization: a Reader. Ed. Charles Lemert, Anthony Elliott, Daniel Chaffee and Eric Hsu. New York: Routledge. 2010. 336-338.

Guthrie, Doug. "Globalizing China." Globalization: a Reader. Ed. Charles Lemert, Anthony Elliott, Daniel Chaffee and Eric Hsu. New York: Routledge. 2010. 331-332.

Ohmae, Kenichi. "The End of the Nation-State." Globalization: a Reader. Ed. Charles Lemert, Anthony Elliott, Daniel Chaffee and Eric Hsu. New York: Routledge. 2010. 209-211.

The Project for the New American Century. "Globalization as Americanization." Globalization: a Reader. Ed. Charles Lemert, Anthony Elliott, Daniel Chaffee and Eric Hsu. New York: Routledge. 2010. 246-247.